# Heuristic Voting as Ordinal Dominance Strategies

Omer Lev, Reshef Meir, Svetlana Obraztsova, Maria Polukarov

> AAAI 2019 Honolulu, Hawaii



#### Voting

A set of voters – V

A set of options (candidates) – C

A voting function **f** to take in voters preferences, and output an outcome



#### Voting manipulation Gibbard-Satterthwaite

Other than in a dictatorship, when agents **know how others are voting**, they may be better off voting differently than they believe.



# Voting manipulation Uncertainty?

What do you do when you do not know what all others are voting for?



# Voting manipulation Uncertainty?

What do you do when you Notkprobability! are voting for?



#### Heuristics Not probability!

A function that takes a certain state and outputs what should the voter vote for:

An arbitrary candidate that isn't the least favorite.

Truth bias

Lazy bias

T-pragmatist

Leader rule




## Previously... Local dominance

A binary model – probable/improbable states, calculated by a metric from a base data point (e.g., poll). Among the probably states, choose a dominant strategy.



Multiple **information sets**, denoting which is more probable than another
























#### **Ordinal domination**

Action a dominates action b if there is an information set where a dominates b.





Arbitrarily voting for anyone that isn't least favorite:

A graph where all candidates are tied with each other.



Local dominance:

A graph where candidates of a certain distance from the winner are tied.



Truth-bias / Lazy-bias:

Level 1: as in local dominace.

Level 2: Truthful vote connected

to all nodes in level 1.



Leader rule

Level 1: top two candidates

Level 2: "star" connecting winner

to all other candidates.



## Iterative voting & local dominance

Regular metric distances induce pivot graphs that are upward closed (if tied with a candidate, also tied with candidates with higher scores).

When using candidate-wise rules, such as  $\ell_{\infty}$ , the pivot graph is a clique at every level



## Iterative voting & local dominance

If voters' model is a cliqued one, the will converge using ordinal dominance when using plurality or veto.



If voters' model is a cliqued one, the will converge using ordinal dominance when using plurality or **veto**.



Known from previous result, Meir, **Plurality voting under uncertainty**, *AAAI 2015* 



#### **Future directions**

More matchings between heuristics and graphs

Creation of novel heuristics using graphs

Convergence results using graph topology

**Graph topology** meaning?

More uncertainty representations using graphs



#### Thanks for listening!

