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Office Address: Department of Economics |
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Tel: |
+972-8-647-2309 |
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Tel: |
+972-53-4290542 |
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E-Mail: |
·
Economic
Theory
·
Game Theory
·
Auction
Theory
·
Contest
Theory
·
Sports
Economics
·
Monderer Dov,
Sela Aner, “A 2x2 Game without the Fictitious Play Property,” Games and
Economic Behavior, 14, 1996, 144-148.
· Monderer Dov, Samet Dov, Sela Aner, “Belief Affirming in Learning
Processes,” Journal of Economic Theory, 73, 1997, 438-458.
· Schlag Karl, Sela Aner, “You Play (an action) Only Once,” Economics
Letters, 3, 1998, 299-303.
· Hon-Snir, Monderer Dov, Sela Aner, “A
Learning Approach to Auctions,” Journal of Economic Theory, 82, 1998,
65-88.
· Herreiner Dorothea, Sela Aner, “Fictitious Play in
Coordination Games,” International Journal of Game Theory, 28, 1999,
189-197.
· Sela Aner, “Fictitious Play in ’One-Against-all’ Multi-Player Games,”
Economic Theory, 14, 1999, 635-651.
· Sela Aner, “Fictitious Play in 2x3 Games,” Games and Economic
Behavior, 31, 2000, 152-162.
· Moldovanu Benny, Sela Aner, “The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in
Contests,” American Economic Review, 91, 2001, 542-558.
· Ezra Einy, Haimanko
Ori, Orzach Ram, Sela Aner, “Dominant Strategies,
Superior Information, and Winner’s Curse in Second-Price Auctions,” International
Journal of Game Theory, 30(3), 2001, 405-412.
· Fibich Gadi, Gavious Arieh, Sela Aner, “Low and High Types in
Asymmetric First-Price Auctions,” Economics Letters, 75, 2002, 283-287.
· Ezra Einy, Haimanko
Ori, Orzach Ram, Sela Aner, “Dominance Solvability of
Second-Price Auctions with Differential Information,” Journal of
Mathematical Economics, 37, 2002, 247-258.
· Kaplan Todd, Luski Israel, Sela Aner, Wettstein David, “All-Pay
Auctions with Variable Rewards,” Journal of Industrial Economics, L(4), 2002, 417-430.
· Moldovanu Benny, Sela Aner, “Patent Licensing to Bertrand Competitors,”
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21(3), 2003, 1-13.
· Gavious Arieh, Moldovanu Benny, Sela Aner, “Bid Costs and Endogenous
Bid Caps,” RAND Journal of Economics, 33(4), 2003, 709-722.
· Fibich Gadi, Gavious Arieh, Sela Aner, “Revenue Equivalence in
Asymmetric Auctions,” Journal of Economic Theory, 115, 2004, 309-321.
· Cohen Chen, Sela Aner, “Manipulations in Contests” Economics Letters,
86, 2005, 135-139.
· Moldovanu Benny, Sela Aner, “Contest Architecture,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 126(1), 2006, 70-97.
· Fibich Gadi, Gavious Arieh, Sela Aner, “All-Pay Auctions with
Risk-Averse Players,” International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 4,
2006, 583-599.
· Moldovanu Benny, Sela Aner, Shi Xianwen,
“Contests for Status,” Journal of Political Economy, 115(2), 2007,
338-363.
· Cohen Chen, Sela Aner, "Contests with Ties," The B.E.
Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 7, 2007, Iss.
1. Article 43.
· Cohen Chen, Sela Aner, "Allocation of Prizes in Asymmetric All-Pay
Auctions," European Journal of Political Economics, 24, 2008,
123-132.
· Moldovanu Benny, Sela Aner, Shi Xianwen,
"Competing Auctions with Endogenous Quantities," Journal of
Economic Theory, Vol. 141, 2008, 1-27.
· Cohen Chen, Kaplan Todd, Sela Aner, “Optimal Rewards in Contests,” RAND
Journal of Economics, 39(2), 2008, 434-451.
· Hoppe Heidrun, Moldovanu Benny, Sela Aner, "The Theory of
Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals", Review of Economic
Studies, 76(1), 2009, 253-281.
· Kaplan Todd,
Sela Aner, "Effective Contests," Economics Letters, 106, 2010,
38-41.
· Sela Aner,
"Best-of-Three All-Pay Auctions," Economics letters, 112(1),
2011, 67-70.
· Groh Christian, Moldovanu benny, Sela Aner, Sunde Uwe, “Optimal Seeding
in Elimination Tournaments,” Economic Theory, 49, 2012, 59-80.
· Sela Aner, "Sequential Two-Prize Contests," Economic
Theory, 51(2), 2012, 383-395.
· Moldovanu
Benny, Sela Aner, Shi Xianwen, "Carrots
and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests," Economic Inquiry
50(2), 2012, 453-462.
· Aloni Elad,
Sela Aner, "The Assortative Matching Scheme in a Survival Battle," Economics
Letters 117, 2012, 272-275.
· Megidish
Reut, Sela Aner, “Allocation of Prizes in Contests with Participation
Constraints,” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 22(4),
2013, 713-727.
· Sela Aner, Erez
Eyal, “Dynamic Contests with Resource Constraints,” Social Choice and
Welfare 41(4), 2013, 863-882.
· Megidish
Reut, Sela Aner, “Sequential Contests with Synergy and Budget Constraints,” Social
Choice and Welfare, 42(1), 2014, 215-243.
· Segev Ella,
Sela Aner, "Sequential All-Pay Auctions with Noisy Outputs," Journal
of Mathematical Economics, 50(1), 2014, 251-261.
·
Megidish Reut, Sela Aner, “Caps in
Sequential Contests,” Economic Inquiry, 52(2), 2014, 608-617.
· Segev Ella,
Sela Aner," Multi-Stage Sequential All-Pay Auctions," European
Economic Review, 70, 2014, 371-382.
· Segev Ella,
Sela Aner, "Sequential All-Pay Auctions with Head Starts," Social
Choice and Welfare, 43(4), 2014, 893-923.
· Minchuk Yizhaq,
Sela Aner, "All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes," Games
and Economic Behavior, 88, 2014, 130-134.
· Einy
Ezra, Haimanko Ori, Moreno Diego, Sela Aner, Shitovitz Binyamin, "Equilibrium Existence in Tullock
Contests with Incomplete Information," Journal of Mathematical
Economics, 61, 2015, 241-245.
· Einy
Ezra, Haimanko Ori, Orzach
Ram, Sela Aner, "Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information
and Bid Caps," International Journal of Game Theory, 45(1), 2016,
63-88.
· Einy
Ezra, Haimanko Ori, Orzach
Ram, Sela Aner, "Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric
Information," International Journal of Game Theory, 46, 2017,
79-102.
· Krumer
Alex, Megidish Reut, Sela Aner, "First-Mover
Advantage in Round-Robin Tournaments," Social Choice and Welfare
48(3), 2017, 633-658.
· Sela Aner,
"Two-stage contests with effort-dependent values of winning," Review
of Economic Design 21(4), 2017, 253-272.
· Krumer
Alex, Megidish Reut, Sela Aner, "Round-Robin
Tournaments with a Dominant Player," Scandinavian Journal of Economics
119(4), 2017, 1167-1200.
· Minchuk Yizhaq,
Sela Aner, " Prebidding First-Price Auctions
with and without Head Starts," Mathematical Social Sciences, 91,
2018, 51-55.
· Minchuk Yizhaq,
Sela Aner, "Asymmetric Sequential Search under Incomplete
Information," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 27(2),
2018, 315-325.
· Iluz
Asaf, Sela Aner, " Sequential Contests with First and Secondary
Prizes," Economics Letters, 171, 2018, 6-9.
· Aiche
Avishay, Einy Ezra, Haimanko
Ori, Moreno Diego, Sela Aner, Shitovitz Binyamin,
"Tullock Contests Reward Information Advantage," Economics
Letters, 172, 2018, 34-36.
· Cohen Noam,
Maor Guy, Sela Aner, "Two-Stage Elimination Contests with Optimal Head
Starts," Review of Economic Design, 22, 2018, 177-192.
· Cohen Chen,
Levi Ofer, Sela Aner, "All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Effort
Constraints," Mathematical Social Sciences, 97, 2019, 18-23.
· Levi-Tsedek Netanel, Sela Aner, "Sequential
(One-Against-All) Contests," Economics Letters, 175, 2019, 9-11.
· Aiche
Avishay, Einy Ezra, Haimanko
Ori, Moreno Diego, Sela Aner, Shitovitz Binyamin,
"Information in Tullock Contests," Theory and Decision,
86(3-4), 2019, 303-323.
· Nissim Netanel,
Sela Aner, "The Third Place Game," Journal of Sports Economics,
21(1), 2020, 64-86.
· Krumer
Alex, Megidish Reut, Sela Aner, "The Optimal
Design of Round-Robin Tournaments with Three Players," Journal of
Scheduling, 23, 2020, 379-396.
· Minchuk Yizhaq,
Sela Aner, "Contests with Insurance," Review of Economic Design,
24, 2020, 1-22.
· Sela Aner,
Tsahi Oz, "On the Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Best-of-Three All-Pay
Auctions," Social Choice and Welfare, 55,
2020, 255-273.
· Cohen Din, Sela
Aner, “Common-Value Group Contests with Asymmetric Information,” Economics
Letters, 192, 2020,
109164.
· Einy
Ezra, Moreno Diego, Sela Aner, “Continuity and Robustness of Bayesian
Equilibria in Tullock Contests,” Economic
Theory Bulletin, 8,
2020, 333-345.
· Sela Aner,
“Optimal Allocations of Prizes and Punishments
in Tullock Contests,” International Journal of Game
Theory, 49, 2020,
749-771.
· Alshech Shahar,
Sela Aner, “The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Two-Stage Contests,” Economics Letters, 203, 2021, 109850.
· Sela Aner,
“Reverse Contests,” Operations Research Letters, 49(3), 2021, 439-441.
· Sela Aner, “Effort
Allocations in Elimination Tournaments,” Economics Letters, 211, 2022,
110261.
· Cohen Chen,
Rabi Ishay, Sela Aner, “Assortative Matching by Lottery Contests,” Games,
13(5), 2022, 64.
· Kaplan Todd,
Sela Aner, “Second Price Auctions with Private Entry Costs,” Games,
13(5), 2022, 62.
· Sela Aner,
“Effort Maximization in Contests under Balance Constraints,” Sports
Economics Review, 1, 2023, 100004.
· Cohen Chen, Lagziel David, Levi Ofer, Sela Aner, “The Role of the
Second Prize in All-Pay Auctions with Two
Heterogeneous Prizes,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 105, 2023,
102820.
· Krumer
Alex, Megidish Reut, Sela Aner, " Strategic
Manipulations in Round-Robin Tournaments," Mathematical Social Sciences,
122, 2023, 50-57.
· Sela Aner,”All-Pay Matching Contests,” International
Journal of Game Theory, 52, 2023, 587-606.
· Minchuk Yizhaq,
Sela Aner, " Subsidy and Taxation in All-Pay Auctions under Incomplete
Information," Games and Economic Behavior, 140, 2023, 99-114.
· Sela Aner,
“Resource allocations in the best-of-k (k =2;3) contests,” Journal of
Economics, 139,
2023, 235-260.
· Cohen Chen,
Rabi Ishay, Sela Aner, “Optimal Seedings in Interdependent Contests,” Annals
of Operations Research, 328, 2023, 1263-1285.
· Sela Aner,
"Is There Free-Riding in Group Contests?" Economic Theory Bulletin,
11, 2023, 191-201.
· Sela Aner,
“Two-Stage Elimination Games,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 109, 2023, 102911.
· Sela Aner,
“Intermediate prizes in multi-dimensional contests,” Theory and Decision,
2024, 1-23.
· Minchuk Yizhaq,
Sela Aner, “Carrots and Sticks: Collaboration of Taxation and Subsidies in
Contests,” Journal of Public Economic Theory, forthcoming.
· Sela Aner,
“Unsolicited Prizes in Contests,” Social Choice and Welfare,
forthcoming.
· Sela Aner, “Status
Classification by Lottery Contests,” European Economic Review,
forthcoming.